Jacob Fisher
Thursday, February 24, 2011
Historiography
Dr. Ryan McIlhenny
Modern Historiography
The changes in modern historiography were a reaction to pre-modern historiography. Questions were raised in the enlightenment and the scientific revolution that changed understanding in history. Instead of writing subjectively, modern historiographers began writing very objectively. The debates that occurred in modern historiography were how objective or subjective a person should write, while remaining ultimately objective. If there is a pendulum inside of a pendulum, the outer tending to swing towards the objective side, but the inner swinging somewhere between objectives and subjective. This was the struggle of modern historiography. They developed a new focus in history, and new process’s of writing history.
In pre-modern historiography, most historians followed the writing style of Herodotus. In pre-modern historiography, the Herodotean writing style was epic in nature, it was Homeric, it was a narrative. These Historians wrote grand narratives, based on facts, following reality, they researched their facts, they did their homework, but they included details that they could never have known. It was this addition of fictitious information, putting a speaker’s speech into their own words among other things that, in the mind of modern historiographers, lost them their credibility. They included fiction into their history, they were very subjective, they loved to create history, and this is what modern historiographers were reacting against.
Pre-modern historiography was written for posterity, it was written for mimicry; men wrote history so that future generations could read it and learn from it. It was written about either great men, or great nations, or great cultures. It was written to glorify either the historian, or the focus of the writing, Achilles for Homer, Greece for Herodotus, Pericles and Athens for Thucydides, Rome for Cicero, etc. In the pre-modern mind, greatness just was, a great man was great by his own doing.
There is a big change between pre-modern and modern historiography. This change was largely brought about by Leopold Von Ranke, and the University of Berlin. The University of Berlin created a department for history in their university, and Leopold Von Ranke was the head of this department. It was his style seminars that modernized historiography; it was his focus on primary sources that matured historiography. It was his famous statement about writing history, “As it actually happened”, that defined modern historiography, and spurred the new styles and emphases.
Modern historiography changed from pre-modern historiography in a few ways. First, the process of writing was different. The emphasis in modern historiography was heavily on the objective, it was no longer these epic narratives. Von Ranke’s creed of “writing history as it actually happened” was the basis for modern historiography. But this creed was interpreted in two ways. History was to be written either as a science or as an art. In either case, it had to be quite objective, it had to be written as it actually happened. But this writing was still either subjective or objective, art or science. History as a science was the objective side of the objectivity of modern historiography. It claimed that history was to be examined and documented similar to how a scientist observes and documents when studying animals in the wild, or chemicals in a lab. Through this studying, we can determine true history, it is strictly as it actually happened, not as creation or imagination at all.
The first historian for the history as science writing style was Leopold Von Ranke. Von Ranke, wanting history to be written as it actually happened, had a strong case for the method of writing history. It was through strict and careful immersion into the primary sources; this intensive study of the particulars would bring about an understanding of the universal. Von Ranke was strongly focused on the universal; the universal was the ultimate goal for him, history was pointless without the drawing out of the universal meaning, one studies the particulars only in so far as to reach the universal value. He says that the job of history in itself is to “lift itself from the investigation of the particulars to a universal view of events” (Stern 59). Von Ranke critiques philosophers for having such narrow understanding of history, and for writing about only the things that would support their claims, and forget everything else; focusing on particulars, and only a few at that. There are a few qualities that Von Ranke feels that a historian must have to be true, the second quality he lists says that a historian cannot have preconceived ideas like a philosopher (59). This is crucial, because history must be objective, written as it actually happened. The philosopher’s imagination taints history, their abstract arguments, that draw only from the few things that support them, forgetting what does not support their argument. Von Ranke does not agree with Thucydides when he says that “History is philosophy teaching by example”, because philosophy does not adequately depict history. Von Ranke says “there are only two ways of acquiring knowledge about human affairs: through the perception of the particular, or through abstraction; the latter is the method of philosophy, the former of history” (58).
The next proponent of history as a science is John Bury. Bury, like Von Ranke, does not appreciate pre-modern historiography, but praises modern historiographies objectivity when he talks about history “forsaking her old irresponsible ways and preparing to enter into her kingdom” (210). Bury says that history is something that has to be associated with the sciences, and that its connections to literature has been a blindfold on the eyes of men, concealing histories new dwelling in the heavens (211). Bury explains that to discover truth, one has to follow some very exact methods, these methods must be scientific in nature, or else they are not of value. If history is mingled with the arts, than the discovery of truth cannot be certain (212). He explains that history must be discovered through the strictest scientific research. But also, that science cannot be controlled, it just is, reality, facts are as they are, history cannot be controlled by the historian, no matter how artistic they are, because as soon as the historian attempts to control history, he loses it (217). The final thing that Bury explains and confirms is that history is written for the sake of posterity. Historians write today, so that future generations can grow from it. A historian, in the eyes of Bury, does not have the right to ask why he is doing his work, collecting data and organizing it, because it is for future generations, to grow from it, to learn, to do whatever they want with it. It is not the business of us to ask why, the job is left for future generations. In saying this, Bury includes the element of faith in history. It is not just cold rational work; there is an element of faith, faith that the work that we do will benefit the future (219).
For a final example, the historiographer, Henry Thomas Buckle, is a great proponent for the history as science style. Buckle agrees with Bury on very many points, and he even takes them a step further. Buckle is adamant that historians must approach history like scientists approach science. They need to observe, predict, test, theorize, and if the theories hold up, derive general laws about humanity, derive historical laws. This is something that a few historians have achieved in part because of patience and observation, and have laid the ground work for the discovery of these universal laws (125). Buckle derives a few laws; his first law being how a civilization grows from a simple society living and working simply to exist to a society that produces lasting value to humanity. To come to this law, he first explains that there are four things that need to be present and satisfactory, climate, food, soil, and the general aspect of nature (129). From these things, the first and greatest thing gained is an accumulation of wealth. This is important to him because if a society is only producing enough for simply each person’s needs, then there is no accumulation of wealth. And when people are so focused on simply living, they cannot spend time in leisure, and without leisure, a society cannot gain knowledge, which is what advances it to a great society, to a thriving society that benefits the whole world (130). Buckle then criticizes history that is written in a subjective style because he says it is romantic, focusing on wars, and great men, and great nations. These things, buckle says, are interesting, and fun to read, but they are “utterly useless, because they neither furnish new truths, nor do they supply the means by which new truths may be discovered” (133).
History as a science is the first of two methods that was debated, the second being history as art. The argument in the history as art is that history is a literary thing, it is subjective. The artistic historians were very adamant about the subjective, creative influence in the writing of history. They were so adamant about its need in history that they would say that it cannot be writing without it, it is essential. The history as art side of the argument would argue that historians were to approach history similar to the way a painter would approach a portrait.
The first historian that needs to be examined is Thomas Babington Macaulay. Macaulay is debatably the greatest of the modern historiographers. He is a proponent to the subjective side of historiography, to the artistic side, but only in as much as the scientific side fails. He would have a historian, the perfect historian, use his imagination only in the times when the facts, the objective and the science, cannot adequately describe the reality. Even when a historian must use his imagination, it must always be done with the utmost care so as to not misrepresent the truth. Macaulay, like Von Ranke, criticizes the philosopher for doing just that. The historian must use his imagination to create a narrative that is sufficient and affecting and picturesque, but it must be controlled enough so that it does not lose the reality of the history, or that he doesn’t change the facts to fit his own hypotheses (73). It is this very thing, losing the reality to ones imagination that Macaulay criticizes Herodotus for. He says that Herodotus was from beginning to end, an inventor, like a child. His mind was far too imaginative to fit the reality of the history that he was writing about (73, 74). Macaulay would have the perfect historian approach history in the same way that a painter would approach a portrait. When a painter is depicting a portrait, he could paint in the eyes and mouth, all of the parts, each of the facts, all the details, all the particulars, but that portrait would be one, very cluttered and messy, but it would also be boring. Macaulay explains that painting in this method is very mechanical and anti-climactic; this is like the objective side of history, the scientific side. It is boring, and mechanical, and it becomes fake, it is just bad. Macaulay suggests however, that a painter that uses his imagination, never departing from the actual depiction, but uses his imagination enough, only when the specific details do not suffice, then the painting becomes a resemblance, but more so than that, it becomes a complete record of all that has occurred up to that point, it can bring into notice all the fantastic details and brilliance that would be lost when one soley focuses on the particulars (75). This is history as an art at its greatest heights, and this is a height that just cannot be achieved through strict focus on the particulars.
George Macaulay Trevelyan was another proponent of the history as art movement. He argues with as much tenacity and authority as his Great Uncle Thomas Babington Macaulay. Trevelyan counters the arguments of, most prominently, John Bury and Thomas Buckle. The first thing that Trevelyan does is define the work of a historian. He does this by asking the question “ought history be merely the accumulation of facts about the past, or ought it also be the interpretation of facts about the past”. He then goes further and asks whether or not history should be expounded in “their full emotional and intellectual value”. He finally asks the question, based upon the prior two whether or not “emotion should be excluded from history on the ground that history deals only with the science of cause and effect in human affairs” (230). He is questioning how a historian is to expound history, is it cold and scientific, or is it creative, imaginative and alive? If it is purely a physical science, or to be treated as such, then there are things it needs to accomplish. It needs to have practical application, and it needs to derive laws. Trevelyan explains how history does not and cannot do either of these things. He says “no one can by knowledge of history, however profound, invent the steam engine, or light a town, or cure cancer” (230). He then explains how historical laws cannot be derived because no matter how much evidence there is to prove a law, there are an equal number of evidences to disprove the same law. He uses the example of starvation leading to revolt, and starvation leading to submission, either case is proven. Therefore laws cannot be adequately derived from history (231). Another reason why history cannot be a science, why historical laws cannot be derived based on events from the timeline is because any event involves dozens, hundreds, thousands, even millions of people, and to derive a basic law about that event would involve the interviewing of each person to determine their motivations, which is not possible (232).
The last example of a subjective historian, is Charles Beard. Beard argues that a historian may try to be objective in his writing, but that objectivity is always riddled with his own biases, the authors own subjectivity. Beard argues that a historian, or rather, a person can never escape their context, their bias’s that determine who they are, and how they perceive the world, events, actions, etc. This bias is based on ones context, being: race, culture, religion, sex, age, nationality, political views, philosophical views, aesthetic interests, etc (317). This context shapes and defines our perceptions, and so when Von Ranke attempts his “noble dream” of writing objectively, writing as it actually happened, he fails from the start, because he immediately incorporates his own perceptions into his writing, his perception of events.
The second reaction to pre-modern historiography that occurred in modern historiography was the value of writing. In pre-modern historiography, the value was for mimicry of great men, it was so that future generations could learn of great men and mimic them for their own greatness. The problem with this is that it never defines what makes something great, how greatness is achieved. These great men of the past were just great, how they became great is not explained, it just was. Pericles was a great man, but his greatness is never explained, how did he become great, what was the specific greatness that he had, that other men did not have. It was this pre-modern focus on the core that the modern historian, Karl Marx, engaged. Marx, in his materialistic history, challenged the idea that the core was great in itself, and rather explained that a man became great because of the exploitation of other men. In Marx’s materialistic history, he explains that a person is what he makes, a person becomes what he makes, and the products of a man are partially that man. If I were to build a chair, I would invest myself into that chair, part of that chair would be a part of me, and part of me would be that chair. I am what I make. So when the core takes the productions of the periphery and claims it as their own, the core is exploiting the periphery to build itself, it is great because it steals the work and greatness of the periphery. With this challenge, the “how” and the “why” of pre-modern historiography is altered, and modern historiography is begun.
The effects of modern historiography changed the perceptions and attitude toward history. History is no longer an undirected writing style, it is no longer a focus on greatness for the sake of greatness. It is disciplined, it is directed, as much as it can be. History must be looked at objectively, it must be in connection with reality, but that reality can never be truly seen based on itself, based on the bare facts. A true understanding of history must incorporate both definitions of history, it must include both big “H” History and little “h” history as well. It must be investigation of the facts, an investigation followed through careful examination and observation, done scientifically, but the interpretation of facts and the exposition of facts and value must be done artfully, it must be done subjectively. These two sides cannot stray too far from each other ever, or else history because muddied, and it loses its value and purpose; truth is lost, and mankind is left in a pitiful estate.
